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Interoception is an often neglected but crucial aspect of the human minimal self. In this 
perspective, we extend the embodiment account of interoceptive inference to explain the 
development of the minimal self in humans. To do so, we first provide a comparative 
overview of the central accounts addressing the link between interoception and the minimal 
self. Grounding our arguments on the embodiment framework, we propose a bidirectional 
relationship between motor and interoceptive states, which jointly contribute to the 
development of the minimal self. We present empirical findings on interoception in 
development and discuss the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self. 
Moreover, we make theoretical predictions that can be tested in future experiments. Our 
goal is to provide a comprehensive view on the mechanisms underlying the minimal self 
by explaining the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self.
Keywords: interoception, bodily self, embodied cognition, cardioception, development of minimal self
INTEROCEPTION AND THE BODILY MINIMAL SELF
Body representation in humans is subsumed under the so-called bodily or minimal self, which 
is defined as a “person’s phenomenal experience in the here and now” (Hafner et  al., 2017, 
p.  1; Gallagher, 2000). The bodily or minimal self of humans is heavily dependent on the 
“embedded body” (Gallagher, 2000, p.  15). The minimal self consists of the sense of ownership, 
which refers to the feeling that one’s body belongs to oneself, and the sense of agency, which 
is the feeling that one’s actions cause effects (Gallagher, 2000; Verschoor and Hommel, 2017). 
Given the crucial role of the body in conceptualizing the sense of ownership and the sense 
of agency, and hence the human minimal self, it is surprising that internal bodily signals such 
as heartbeat and respiration have been largely ignored in this line of research (Tsakiris et  al., 
2011; Marshall et  al., 2018; Seth and Tsakiris, 2018). For instance, a newborn’s heart beats at 
ca. 127 beats per minute (bpm) increasing to a maximum of ca. 145 bpm within 1 month, 
before it decreases to 112 bpm by the age of 2 years (Fleming et al., 2011). Heartbeat perception 
is central to research on interoception, which is traditionally defined as the perception and 
sensation of the internal bodily signals (Murphy et  al., 2017). From an embodied cognition 
perspective, it seems implausible that such bodily changes during development would not 
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affect the body representation, hence the minimal self. In this 
paper, we  argue that interoceptive signals are fundamental to 
the phenomenal experience of here and now constructing the 
minimal self. Grounding our arguments on the embodiment 
framework, we discuss how interoception shapes the development 
of the minimal self in humans.
Our perspective aims to extend the embodied cognition 
account of interoceptive inference (Marshall et  al., 2018) by 
explicitly focusing on the role of interoception in the development 
of the human minimal self. The call for the research topic 
postulates embodied cognition as a powerful framework in 
explaining the minimal self (Hafner et  al., 2021). Embodied 
cognition accounts are manifold (for detailed overviews see, 
e.g., Wilson, 2002; Shapiro, 2019) varying regarding central 
assumption and their “radicalism” (Raab and Araujo, 2019, 
p. 1) with respect to whether the link between the environment 
and perception, cognition and action is direct (e.g., Gibson, 
1979; Chemero, 2011; Jacob, 2016) or mediated through 
representations (e.g., Newen et al., 2018). We base our perspective 
on the central assumption that representations benefit human’s 
flexible and adaptive way of acting in a complex world (Schulz, 
2018). We  thereby take a “moderate” position (cf., Goldman, 
2012), acknowledging at the same time that other approaches 
exist aiming to overcome the separation of approaches (e.g., 
Witt and Riley, 2014; Ciaunica et  al., 2021). In addition, our 
embodied cognition perspective considers bodily changes relevant 
to explaining human development (Musculus et al., 2021), and, 
here, relate it to the development of the self.
Our contribution consists of a comparative overview of the 
central theoretical accounts explaining the link between 
interoception and the bodily minimal self (Marshall et  al., 
2018; Seth and Tsakiris, 2018). Based on this comparison, 
we  present our embodied cognition perspective in more detail 
focusing on the emerging minimal self. Following a discussion 
of empirical findings on how interoception shapes the 
development of the bodily minimal self, we will outline theoretical 
predictions and a research program to better understand the 
role of interoception in the development of the bodily minimal 
self from our embodied cognition perspective.
Comparative Overview of Theoretical 
Accounts
In this part, we  will compare two theoretical accounts that 
explain the role of interoception in the bodily minimal self 
on three levels (i.e., origin, central model assumptions, relation 
of interoception to the self).
The instrumental interoceptive inference account, proposed 
by Seth and Tsakiris (2018), originates from cybernetics and 
the free-energy principle. According to the instrumental 
interoceptive inference account (motor) actions serve the 
regulation of interoceptive states through a hierarchically 
organized generative model (Seth et al., 2012; Seth and Tsakiris, 
2018): The generative model encodes priors of sensory 
information in higher levels of the neural hierarchy, based on 
which lower-level information such as interoceptive states are 
predicted. These top-down predictions are compared to the 
perceived interoceptive states. The difference between the 
predicted and the perceived states results in prediction errors, 
which are then sent back to the higher levels in the hierarchy 
to further update the generative models (Seth et  al., 2012; 
Seth and Tsakiris, 2018). Through repetition of this hierarchical 
cascading, interoceptive prediction errors are minimized, which 
eventually maximizes the interoceptive generative models. These 
models form the basis of a sense of self and the experience 
of selfhood (Seth et  al., 2012). Importantly, interoceptive 
prediction errors can also be  minimized through action, also 
known as active inference. In the case of interoception, this 
refers to “intero-actions” (e.g., reflexes). Together, interoceptive 
(active) inference serves the overall goal of allostasis: maintaining 
physiological parameters of the body within a constant range 
by adapting to environmental change (Sterling, 2014; Seth and 
Tsakiris, 2018). This notion draws the connection to the 
experience of selfhood: Interoception fosters the stability of 
the bodily minimal self as opposed to the ever-changing 
exteroceptive information (Tsakiris, 2017).
Marshall et al. (2018) built up on this account and elaborated 
further on the functional link between interoception and (motor) 
actions. This approach is strongly influenced by cognitive 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience. According to Marshall 
et  al. (2018), both motor and interoceptive states can form 
predictions about each other. Predictions are then compared 
to afferent, sensory input stemming from the sensorimotor 
system in the case of the motor prediction, and the autonomic 
system in the case of interoceptive predictions. Importantly, 
motor and interoceptive predictions are weighed equally in 
how they contribute to subjective experience emphasizing a 
functional bidirectional link. This also draws the connection 
to the experience of selfhood: Interoceptive states modulate 
the experience of selfhood just as strongly as (motor) actions 
(Marshall et  al., 2018).
Embodiment Suggests a Bidirectional 
Link
Both theoretical accounts, although originating from different 
domains, share the idea that predictive coding can be considered 
as the “mechanistic process […] forming an initial, theoretical 
link between” (Marshall et  al., 2018, p.  2) interoception and 
the minimal self. The accounts differ in how they elaborate 
on the functional relationship between interoception and motor 
processes. From an instrumental interoceptive inference account, 
the impact of motor predictions on interoceptive states has 
been formulated in terms of a hierarchically organized generative 
model (Seth et  al., 2012). This was extended theoretically by 
explicitly suggesting a bidirectional link in which interoceptive 
states also predict motor actions (Marshall et al., 2018). We find 
the theoretical argument of bidirectionality plausible in line 
with the general tenets of the embodied cognition perspective.
Although both theoretical accounts mention and acknowledge 
the relevance of a developmental approach, neither of them 
focus on development in more detail. We  tap into this gap 
and discuss the development of the minimal self. Recent reviews 
on this topic studied the development of the minimal self 
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through experiencing and interacting with the external world 
(Georgie et  al., 2019; Nguyen et  al., 2021). We  extend this 
line of research by considering the role of interoception in 
the development of the minimal self. In particular, we  derive 
theoretical predictions on the developmental trajectory of 
interoception and discuss its relation to minimal-self dimensions 
such as the sense of ownership and agency from our embodied 
cognition perspective. To do so, we  summarize the evidence 
on the development of body ownership and agency in Figure 1 
(based on Georgie et  al., 2019) and integrate these findings 
with the development of interoception.
DEVELOPMENT OF INTEROCEPTION 
AND THE MINIMAL SELF
Interoception refers to perceiving signals from inner organs 
such as heartbeat, hunger, or breathing (Herbert and Pollatos, 
2012). Interoception also includes the monitoring of these 
internal states during ongoing activities aiming at keeping the 
bodily system stable (Craig, 2008; Herbert and Pollatos, 2012; 
Tsakiris, 2017; Seth and Tsakiris, 2018). Before discussing the 
development of interoception, we  would like to note that 
we  differentiate interoceptive sensitivity from interoceptive 
awareness. Whereas interoceptive sensitivity can be  defined as 
the implicit detection and discrimination of interoceptive signals, 
interoceptive awareness is a meta-cognitive process reflecting 
the explicit evaluation of interoceptive states (Murphy et  al., 
2017). We  consider the findings on the development of 
interoception from this point of view.
Empirical Findings on the Development of 
Interoception
Similar to research on interoception and its role in the minimal 
self in adulthood (Herbert and Pollatas, 2012; Tsakiris, 2017; 
Marshall et  al., 2018), research on interoception development 
has mainly focused on heartbeat perception. In this section, 
we will first present the developmental changes in the frequency 
of heartbeats, which will be  followed by a review on cardiac 
interoception in infants, children, and adolescents. An overview 
of this review can be  found in Figure  1.
Developmental changes in heartbeat frequency can be divided 
into four phases: (1) from birth to 1 month of age during which 
the heart rate increases; (2) from 1 month to 2 years of age, 
in which the heart rate decreases steeply; (3) from 2 to 6 years, 
in which the heart rate decreases but less strongly as compared 
to (4) 6–12 years of age (Fleming et  al., 2011). Thus, from 
birth to childhood up until 12 years of age, pronounced changes 
occur in the frequency of heartbeats. Similar developmental 
changes have been documented for cardiac interoceptive 
abilities (Koch and Pollatos, 2014; Georgiou et  al., 2015; 
Klabunde et  al., 2019; Jones et  al., 2021).
FIGURE 1 | Overview of studies on the development of interoception as well as body representation, multisensory integration, ownership, and agency relevant for 
the human minimal self during infancy, childhood, and adolescence. The hand symbol represents studies on body representation, multisensory integration, 
ownership, and agency. The heart symbol represents studies on interoception. The lower part of the figure summarizes the results of infant studies and the upper 
part of the figure summarizes the study results on children and adolescents. m.o., month-olds; y.o., year-olds.
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In infancy (up to 1 year) and early childhood (1–5 years), 
very few empirical studies investigated interoceptive abilities 
(Fairhurst et al., 2014; Maister et al., 2017). The only published 
empirical study investigating cardiac interoception in infants 
suggests that, already by 5 months of age, infants show sensitivity 
to their cardiac signals (Maister et  al., 2017). In this study, 
infants were presented with images that moved synchronously 
or asynchronously with their own heartbeat. Infants looked 
significantly longer at asynchronously presented stimuli suggesting 
that they were able to distinguish asynchronous from synchronous 
stimuli (Maister et  al., 2017). Moreover, individual differences 
in looking times were correlated with heartbeat-evoked potentials, 
a brain signal related to cardiac interoceptive processing (Coll 
et  al., 2021). In other words, infants who responded to the 
synchronous manipulation also showed stronger neural responses 
captured by the heartbeat-evoked potentials. These findings 
support the argument that interoception may contribute to 
the development of the minimal self.
In children (>5 to 12 years) and adolescents (12–18 years), 
interoception has been investigated mostly by adopting approaches 
and methodologies used in adult populations. Empirical findings 
suggest that, similar to adults, children and adolescents show 
individual differences in heartbeat counting tasks (Koch and 
Pollatos, 2014) and self-report measures of interoception such 
as those collected through the Multidimensional Assessment of 
Interoceptive Awareness Questionnaire (Jones et  al., 2021). By 
inducing cardiac perturbation through jumping jacks and assessing 
heartbeat counting abilities before and after the tasks, researchers 
have shown that children accurately count their heartbeats as 
early as 4–6 years of age (Schaan et  al., 2019). Moreover, brain 
areas such as the left insula, cuneus, inferior parietal lobule, and 
prefrontal regions are activated during a heartbeat detection task 
already at 6 years of age (Klabunde et  al., 2019).
Studies in children and adolescents also indicated age-related 
differences in interoception. For example, children’s performance 
in an adapted version of the heartbeat counting task increases 
with age, which marginally predicts emotion regulation, but 
not emotion recognition (Koch and Pollatos, 2014). Moreover, 
during the heartbeat detection task adolescents show increased 
activation in brain regions related to meta-cognition such as 
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, orbital frontal cortex, and 
mid-inferior frontal gyrus as compared to children (Klabunde 
et  al., 2019). This neural pattern of activation might suggest 
that meta-cognitive aspects of interoceptive processing might 
develop throughout adolescence.
Overall, the empirical results describing the developmental 
trajectory of interoception in childhood, and especially in 
infancy, are scarce but much needed. Among others, this scarcity 
of research is likely due to methodological challenges in 
measuring interoception in younger children. Next, we  extend 
the existing embodiment account on interoception and formulate 
theoretical predictions on the development of interoception 
for future research.
Theoretical Predictions
In the following, we formulate developmental predictions derived 
from an embodied cognition account of interoceptive inference. 
Importantly, our embodied cognition perspective assumes that 
representations form the body-goal link (cf., Pacherie, 2018; 
Raab and Araujo, 2019; see Witt and Riley, 2014 for alternative 
accounts considering interoception), enable goal-directed acting 
in a flexible and adaptive manner (Schulz, 2018), as well as 
emerge through sensorimotor and bodily experiences throughout 
development (cf., Musculus et  al., 2021). Given the scarcity 
of research on the development of interoception, and particularly 
on interoceptive modalities such as respiration, thermoregulation 
and so forth, we center our arguments on cardiac interoception 
from birth to 12 years of age. We  focus on this age range 
based on (1) the developmental changes in the frequency of 
heartbeats (Fleming et  al., 2011), (2) motor and bodily 
development (Musculus et  al., 2021), and (3) findings on 
multisensory integration, the sense of ownership and agency 
(see Figure  1; cf., Georgie et  al., 2019). We  point out the 
interaction between multisensory integration of external sensory 
input, ownership, and agency with internal bodily signals in 
the formation of the minimal self in development.
Interoceptive sensitivity is observed in the first months of 
life (Maister et al., 2017). Interestingly, changes in interoceptive 
sensitivity coincide with the improvements in sensorimotor 
mapping such as hand-to-mouth touch (Myowa-Yamakoshi and 
Takeshita, 2006) and goal-directed reaching (Georgie et  al., 
2019). Together, these developments might contribute to the 
formation of body representation, and hence, to the sense of 
ownership in infants at 5–6 months of age (see Figure  1). 
Through improvements in motor skills and continuous 
exploration, infants learn to act in a goal-directed manner 
(i.e., goal-directed touching and reaching). This, in turn, helps 
them to learn about their body boundaries and relate body-
directed goals (e.g., reaching the mouth) to goals in the 
environment. Establishing this relation might pave the way to 
a sense of body ownership in humans.
Moving further in the developmental trajectory, 
we  hypothesize that the first 2 years of life are crucial to 
study the development of interoception. This prediction is based 
on the rapid decrease in heart-beat frequency until 2 years 
of age (Fleming et al., 2011) and the rather general developmental 
embodied cognition premise that phases of rapid bodily changes 
and motor development promote perceptual and cognitive 
changes (Loeffler et al., 2016; Musculus et al., 2021). We further 
hypothesize that there might be  more drastic changes in 
interoceptive sensitivity between 2 and 6 years of age (i.e., 
phases of rapid growth and motor learning) as compared to 
6–12 years of age. Moreover, we expect interoceptive awareness 
to develop during late childhood to adolescence. This change 
is likely due to the development of meta-cognitive processes 
(Klabunde et  al., 2019). The developmental changes in 
interoception coincide with improvements in multisensory 
integration (Cowie et  al., 2016, 2017) and accuracy of reach 
estimations (Croft et  al., 2018), which might indicate more 
accurate representation of the body–environment relation. This 
relation might be further mediated by an increase in confidence 
in judging bodily as well as motor competences.
Further, we  specify the relationship between interoception 
and other minimal-self dimensions such as the sense of ownership 
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and agency. To do so, we  dissociate a low-level agency (i.e., 
agency feeling) from a high-level agency (i.e., agency judgment; 
Synofzik et  al., 2008). We  assume that this distinction develops 
with age. First, we hypothesize that interoceptive sensitivity and 
body ownership are functionally and reciprocally interconnected. 
That is, improvements in perceiving and identifying internal 
bodily signals (i.e., interoception) as well as the boundary 
between one’s body and the external environment (i.e., body 
ownership) should benefit one another. For example, perceiving 
one’s heartbeat might promote the feeling of the body as one’s 
own. Moreover, we hypothesize that improvements in interoceptive 
awareness in late childhood or adolescence could coincide with 
a high-level agency judgment due to the involvement of meta-
cognitive processes. Overall, we  argue that considering the 
interaction between interoception, other minimal-self components 
and bodily development is crucial to define, test, and disentangle 
mechanisms underlying minimal-self development.
Future Research and Conclusion
We suggest a research program to empirically test the predictions 
on the development of interoception. The program entails 
specific study designs and a psychophysiological multi-method 
approach to capture the developmental trajectory of interoception 
as well as its relation to other minimal-self components such 
as ownership and agency.
We need longitudinal designs to test the developmental 
trajectories. Longitudinal designs enable us to disentangle 
intraindividual changes over the course of development as well 
as interindividual differences when people of the same age 
develop differently. Moreover, training studies would inform 
our understanding of the relationship between bodily changes 
and interoception. In training studies different training groups 
differentially targeting the bodily system could be implemented 
to look at the respective effects on interoception. For instance, 
infants and children could engage in physical exercises that 
either lead to an increase or a decrease in their heart rate 
and the respective effects on interoceptive abilities could 
be  measured.
To investigate the link between interoception and other 
minimal-self components such as ownership and agency, 
measurements from both lines of research need to be combined. 
Therefore, we  suggest that interoception paradigms should 
be  jointly implemented with body representation (cf., Suzuki 
et  al., 2013) and multisensory integration paradigms in infant 
and child studies (e.g., Cowie et  al., 2016, 2017). Studies 
combining measures within the same developmental study would 
improve our understanding of how multiple sources of bodily 
and sensory information contribute to the development of the 
self. This would allow us to better understand how ownership 
and agency relate to and change in relation to interoception.
In combination, developmental study designs and a 
psychophysiological multi-method approach (Hoffmann et  al., 
2018) could even help testing potentially competing mechanisms 
(Marshall et  al., 2018; Seth and Tsakiris, 2018) on the relation 
between interoception and (motor) action and their respective 
contribution to the minimal self. Combining cohort-longitudinal 
designs by enrolling infants and children of different 
ages with simultaneously applying  cardiac-physiological 
(electrocardiography), neural (electroencephalography), and 
motor (electromyography) measures might help disentangle 
these mechanisms. In particular, event-related, reaction-time 
paradigms could be  used that require a motor response. At 
the same time cardiac and motor measures could be combined 
to infer how interoceptive and motor states functionally interact 
in the same experimental task.
There are other developmental aspects that we do not elaborate 
on due to our focus on childhood rather than infancy. However, 
we  deem the following aspects relevant for future work on 
interoception: The relation between interoception and active 
self-touch as well as the role of social interactions. Infancy 
work has lately also considered the link between interoception 
and haptic perception (i.e., active self-touch; Fotopoulou and 
Tsakiris, 2017). This work suggests that active self-touch might 
benefit the later integration of tactile-proprioceptive and visual 
information relevant for minimal-self development (see Nguyen 
et  al., 2021 for a review). Besides, social  interactions have 
been considered to play a crucial role in the development of 
the minimal self, particularly in the development of interoceptive 
abilities in early infancy (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017). Given 
that infants are born with limited motor skills, they depend 
on others to regulate their own bodily needs such as hunger. 
Thus, infants rely on embodied interactions with their caregivers 
in order to regulate their interoceptive states. These interactions 
allow them to learn the regularities within and outside their 
bodies (Tsakiris, 2017). Future studies should empirically test 
the role of embodied interactions in the construction of the 
minimal self early on in life, including all aspects such as 
interoception, agency, and ownership.
To sum up, a comprehensive research program is warranted. 
Such a program would further benefit from a new 
psychophysiological approach (Hoffmann et al., 2018) and from 
studying social aspects of interoception (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 
2017). Together, we  hope that the theoretical predictions and 
the research program introduced in this perspective will promote 
future research to understand the role of interoception in the 
development of the minimal self.
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